by a dense and differentiated network of oral, print, and broadcast media, all under the immediate direction of territorial party commitees situated in each administrative jurisdiction of the country.
Through them, the leadership endeavors to shape popular consciousness and to prevent the dissemination of facts or ideas antithetical to the regime's doctrinally-based legitimacy.
As the volume of party-guided communications has grown, the party has expanded and refined its repertoire of controls without substantially enlarging the size of the full-time apparat charged with oversight of the ideological process. This has been accomplished by combining direct with indirect controls.
Following tradition, we may classify the lines of direct control as either "vertical," I ,e , those subordinating a particular party committee to the committee at the territorial level superior to it in the hierarchy, or "horizontal," referring to the control exerted by a territorial party committee over the government and other organizations located in its jurisdiction. There may be one such non-staff instructor for every three to four regular staff officials, but this is the roughest of estimates.
Under the direct supervision of each territorial party committee are a variety of media organizations, such as newspapers, radio and television studios, and publishing houses.
Party control over the media is facilitated by the censorship system, but full-time party officials themselves spend a Propagandists teach classes in the adult political education system. 6 By winning the trust of their audiences, by responding in a convincing and informed way to their questions, the oral communicators are expected to serve as the crucial link between regime and society, the primary source of opinion and information for all groups of the population. The party operates on the assumption that there is never an ideological vacuum: the weakening of socialist ideology leads to the strengthening of an alien doctrine. 7 Therefore, the Handbook of the Party Group
Leader writes in its 1979 edition, communists must try to influence public opinion in the collective, using personal contacts to explain party policy to the masses. They must seize the initiative in conversations so that attitudes of indifference, parochialism, and passivity do not take hold. S
The role designated for the activists resembles the part played by the "opinion leaders' identified in the 1940s and 1950s
in American models of social influence. 9 The opinion leaders were those who drew opinions most widely from the mass media, and in turn influenced the opinion of others with whom they came into contact.
As Alex Inkeles stressed in his study of political persuasion in the stalin era, the effectiveness of political indoctrination depended on the party's success in making its activists into actual opinion leaders among the rank and file members of society.10
The division of labor in ideological work between party activists and mass media has persisted since before the Bolshevik offer what they regard as the "correct" answer in order to avoid incurring official disfavor. In such a situation they may also respond with an answer such as "don't know" or "hard to say"
(zatrudniaius' otvetit'). Finally, we must recognize the possibility of deliberately misreported results. 17
Without knowing for certain the magnitude and direction of error in the Soviet studies, one can only adopt an attitude of caution in using them. Two assumptions will be made about the utility of these studies. First, where possible, analogous local studies will be compared and the ranges of responses will be taken as the basis for analysis when it can be shown that they are broadly convergent. 18 Second, the studies will be treated as "schematic" rather than "true" maps of the distribution of opinion.
That is, like a subway map, they will be used as indicators of the relative rather than absolute location of points on similar scales. In this way, we can avoid some of the problems inherent in taking the reported findings too literally, while preserving at least some of the useful information they contain. More striking from the standpoint of the ideological process, however, is the high proportion of individuals who simply cannot understand the jargon in which political ideas are expressed.
Terms such as "initiative" and "deviz" (i.e., the "banner slogan" of a particular campaign), which are continually used in association with campaigns for "socialist competition" (i.e. the contests among collectivities to achieve the highest production), turn out not to be understood by over half of those with less than a complete secondary education. 26 A survey in Krasnodarsk asked newspaper readers to summarize a current and widely publicized political campaign; scarcely over half could do so.27 Another study reports that from 20 to 30~~of the readers of the local press are unable to draw appropriate conclusions from materials in the central press concerning local, national, and world events;
one of the tasks of the local newspapers, accordingly, is to provide short and comprehensible summaries of current affairs to their readers.28
One of the most innovative attempts to classify the types of incomprehension of official messages is that of Tamara Dridze, whose research was based on a massive and multi-faceted sociological project centered in the city of Taganrog between 1968 and 1970. She concluded that for many individuals, the commonly used terms of doctrine are barriers rather than aids to understanding. Mastery of political language, she found, depends only partly on education. Her work was based on a sample of 300, which she broke into seven categories based on the respondents' ability to grasp the texts of ordinary newspaper articles. Only 12% of her sample could fully and properly understand the media.
Another 17% could follow the articles, understanding the key terms only if they were used in familiar contexts. European public research data in addition to Soviet data. In
